See below a clip of Konstantin Kistin (“Triggernometry”) on why every socialist society ends in totalitarianism.
My recent “tussle”, in the link below, with several of the main AI- i.e. notably Google’s AI Overview, Grok, and Chatgpt. I pushed them on how certain dominant themes from primitive mythologies (i.e. the “apocalyptic millennialism”, or “salvation through violent destruction”, that was formalized in Zoroaster’s cosmic dualism) that these themes have continued to prominently shape modern human narratives, both religious and secular, with destructive outcomes for our societies.
Note that I had to challenge Chat for responding with its usual excessive cautionary qualifying. That qualifying weakens critical points that have to be made against clearly dominant trends in the public discourse of our contemporary world.
At stake in these issues is the protection and continued survival of liberal democracies that are under constant threat from Marxist collectivism, apocalyptic environmentalism, and religious theocracy, all committed to replacing liberal democracy with their varied totalitarianisms.
I pushed the varied AI to probe the material in sections below on the main ideas/beliefs/themes that drive human thinking, feeling, motivation, and behavior.
I began with….
What is said here at http://www.wendellkrossa.com/ about the ideas/beliefs/themes that drive Iranian theocracy are also true of Marxism and environmentalism- dominant contemporary movements structured and driven by the same basic ideas/beliefs/themes. Notably driven by the themes of “Apocalyptic millennialism” or “salvation through violent destruction”.
These ideas/beliefs were formed by the earliest humans trying to understand and explain the world they were in, especially explain their suffering and their emerging awareness that they would die. As Joseph Campbell has rightly noted, death instigated the earliest human efforts at mythmaking.
AI Overview responded:
Joseph Campbell argued that the recognition of mortality— the awareness of death— is the foundational catalyst for all mythmaking. He did not mean his own death in 1987, but rather the human confrontation with death as the starting point of mythological thought. [1, 2, 3]
• The Origin in Burial: Campbell believed that the earliest evidence of mythological thinking is associated with grave burials. The sight of a loved one who was warm and talking becoming cold and still forced early humans to wonder where that life went.
• Myth as Survival Mechanism: Facing mortality causes immense fear, and myth-making arose as a way to handle this, helping humans conceptualize the experience of death.
• Death is Giving: Campbell viewed death not as a tragic end but as an essential part of life’s cycle, noting that “Everything that lives, lives on the death of something else”.
• The Four Functions: Campbell explained in Occidental Mythology that one of the primary functions of myth is to reconcile human consciousness to the inevitability of death.
In short, according to Campbell, myths are the symbolic language created to make sense of the mystery of life and the inevitability of death. You can explore this concept in depth in the Joseph Campbell Foundation’s post “Death and the Game of Life”.
I then asked:
How then does Apocalyptic millennialism or “salvation through violent destruction” as the dominant theme in many religions relate to death instigating mythmaking?
AI Overview replied:
In Joseph Campbell’s view, apocalyptic millennialism is not a literal prediction of a “fiery Armageddon.” Instead, it is a psychological metaphor for the death of the ego and the end of a narrow, outmoded worldview.
Death as a Psychological Catalyst
Campbell argued that mythmaking begins with the recognition of mortality. Apocalyptic themes scale this individual experience to a cosmic level:
• Death of the Old World: The “end of the world” represents the necessary destruction of ignorance and complacency.
• Salvation through Renewal: In many religions, violent destruction is a ritualized way to “kill” the infantile ego, allowing a more mature, spiritual self to be born.
• The Inevitability of Change: Just as a seed must “die” to become a plant, a society’s current structures must often perish to make way for a “New Heaven and New Earth.”
Key Relationships Between Death and Apocalypse
Campbell connected the personal fear of death to the religious theme of violent salvation through several specific concepts:
• Ego Death: The violent imagery of the apocalypse mirrors the internal struggle to surrender the “separate self” and realize a connection to the eternal.
• The Great Reversal: Campbell noted a shift in mythology around 2000 BC where death stopped being seen as a natural part of life and started being viewed as something to “escape” or “conquer,” leading to more aggressive salvation narratives.
• Eternity vs. Time: Apocalyptic myth attempts to move the believer from “time” (the realm of birth and death) to “eternity” (the dimension of the here and now).
• Sacrifice and Bliss: The “violence” in these myths often symbolizes the sacrifice of one’s own desires and attachments to achieve a higher state of consciousness or “bliss.”
Core Insight: To Campbell, these religions aren’t actually obsessed with the end of the physical world, but with the end of the world as you currently perceive it.
If you’d like to explore this further, I can look into:
• Specific examples of apocalyptic myths from different cultures (e.g., Norse Ragnarok vs. Christian Book of Revelation).
• How Campbell’s Hero’s Journey incorporates the “death-rebirth” motif.
• The role of sacrifice in early mythological systems.
Which of these would you like to dive into?
My next request:
Lets probe- How Campbell’s Hero’s Journey incorporates the “death-rebirth” motif. The role of sacrifice in early mythological systems
AI Overview replied:
In Joseph Campbell’s framework, the “death-rebirth” motif is the essential mechanism of transformation. He argued that to reach a higher state of being, the previous version of the self must be utterly destroyed.
Death and Rebirth in the Hero’s Journey
Campbell mapped the “Monomyth” as a cycle where the hero must die to their old life to be reborn with a “boon” for society.
• The Belly of the Whale: This stage represents the hero’s entry into the unknown. It is a literal or symbolic “transit of the threshold” into a womb-like darkness where the old ego is shed.
• Atonement with the Father: The hero must “die” to their infantile attachments and fears. This often involves a terrifying encounter that shatters the hero’s limited perspective.
• The Apotheosis: After a symbolic death, the hero enters a state of divine knowledge or “bliss.” They are no longer the person who left home; they have been reborn as a transcendent being.
• The Return: The hero “dies” to the supernatural world to be reborn back into the ordinary world, bringing the wisdom they gained.
The Role of Sacrifice in Early Myth
Campbell viewed sacrifice as the “ritual enactment” of the death-rebirth cycle. It served to align the community with the natural laws of the universe.
• Life Sustained by Death: Early planting cultures observed that crops grow from decaying matter. Sacrifice (of grain, animals, or humans) was a way to mirror this “Great Round” of nature.
• The Primordial Being: Many myths feature a god or giant (like Ymir or Tiamat) who is killed and dismembered to create the world. Sacrifice reenacts this “creative death.”
• Submission of the Ego: In a ritual sense, the sacrifice represents the individual’s willingness to give up their life or “small self” for the sake of the “larger life” of the tribe or the cosmos.
• Blood as Life Force: Blood was seen as the essential energy of the universe. Spilling it was not an act of cruelty, but a way to “recharge” the world’s vitality.
The Link: Whether it is the hero in a cave or a priest at an altar, the message is the same: New life is impossible without the voluntary death of the old.
If you’d like to continue, I can look into:
• Specific ritual sites (like Göbekli Tepe) where early sacrifice and mythmaking collided.
• The transition from literal sacrifice to symbolic sacrifice in modern religions.
• The Norse Ragnarok as a total “sacrifice” of the gods to reset the universe.
How would you like to proceed?
I then asked Grok:
Grok, what are your thoughts on this material?
What is said here at http://www.wendellkrossa.com/ about the ideas/beliefs/themes that drive Iranian theocracy are also true of Marxism and environmentalism- i.e. movements structured and driven by the same basic ideas/beliefs/themes. Notably driven by the themes of “Apocalyptic millennialism” or “salvation through violent destruction”.
These ideas/beliefs were formed by the earliest humans trying to understand and explain the world they were in, especially explain their suffering and their emerging awareness that they would die. As Joseph Campbell has rightly noted, death instigated the earliest human efforts at mythmaking.
AI Overview gave these responses…
And I quoted the above responses of AI Overview…
Grok replied:
Krossa’s core thesis resonates with patterns in human history and psychology, but it needs careful qualification to avoid overgeneralizing. The material links ancient mythmaking— sparked by mortality and suffering— to modern ideological movements via “apocalyptic millennialism” (the belief in a coming cataclysm that destroys evil/corrupt systems, ushering in a purified utopia for the faithful). He sees this template in Iranian Shia theocracy, Marxist revolutions, and radical environmentalism. The Joseph Campbell discussion in the query provides a solid mythological lens for probing why this archetype persists.
The Archetypal Pattern
Humans have long confronted death, finitude, and suffering, leading to myths that impose meaning. Campbell was right: burial practices, the “belly of the whale,” hero’s ego-death, and rebirth motifs reflect this. Sacrifice rituals (literal or symbolic) often reenact the cycle— old life must “die” for new life to emerge, mirroring seasons, agriculture, or personal transformation. Apocalyptic stories scale this up: the current corrupt world/ego/society must be violently purged for salvation/renewal.
This isn’t just ancient religion. It maps onto secular ideologies:
• Iranian theocracy (and similar): A righteous struggle against demonic enemies (Great Satan, etc.) prepares for divine order. Theology of cosmic war justifies violence as sacred duty.
• Marxism: History as class struggle culminating in revolutionary cataclysm, destroying capitalism/bourgeoisie, birthing the classless utopia. Historian Richard Landes and others have traced millennialist Christian roots here (e.g., via Paul’s apocalyptic framing influencing later secular variants).
• Radical environmentalism: “Existential crisis” narratives frame industrial civilization as the fallen order doomed to apocalyptic collapse (climate Armageddon, mass extinctions).
Salvation demands drastic “decarbonization,” degrowth, or systemic destruction— often with moral fervor akin to crusades. Krossa highlights how fear-driven assumptions have been walked back even by IPCC insiders.
The shared structure: diagnose profound corruption/evil in the status quo → demand its violent or coercive overthrow → promise paradise for the elect/survivors. This taps deep psychological wires— fear of death/meaninglessness, desire for purpose as a “hero” in the final battle, and hope for transcendence. It explains the zealotry, savior complexes, and intolerance for dissent (heretics obstruct the millennium).
Campbell’s psychological reading is insightful here: apocalypse as ego-death and worldview shift, not necessarily literal planetary end. Many believers internalize it as personal/metaphorical renewal. But when literalized at scale— especially with in-group/out-group dualism— it fuels real destruction, from revolutions to purges to policy extremism. The “salvation through violent destruction” motif risks justifying harm in the name of higher good.
Strengths of This View
• Explains recurrence: Primal myths embed as archetypes (Jungian flavor in Krossa’s references). They outlive literal religion, mutating into “secular” forms. Nazism had its own millennial twists.
• Psychological honesty: Confronting mortality does drive mythmaking. Better myths help us face it without terror or fanaticism.
• Critique of conditional theology: Krossa’s push for “unconditional love” (drawing from Historical Jesus research, Q sayings, vs. Pauline Christology) as an antidote is intriguing. It counters punitive, dominating deity images that fuel tribal vengeance and apocalypse. Liberal democracy as an institutional expression of inclusion, service, and restraint aligns with healthier outcomes.
• Timely: Alarmism in climate discourse, identity politics, or geopolitical theocracies often echoes these patterns more than pure evidence or pragmatism.
Limitations and Nuances
• Not all versions are equal. Campbell emphasized symbolic/psychological layers; literal apocalypticism varies in danger. Some environmental concern is data-driven problem-solving, not millennial crusade. Marxism had intellectual roots in economics/history beyond pure myth. Iranian theocracy blends theology with power politics.
• Over-reductionism risk: Reducing complex movements solely to ancient death-myths ignores material conditions, institutions, technology, and individual agency. Not every reformer is a closet millennialist.
• Campbell’s own caveats: He celebrated myths’ vitality but warned against literalism and tribalism. Hero’s Journey is about personal growth through trials, not mandating societal Armageddon. Sacrifice evolved from literal (blood) to symbolic (self-discipline, service).
• Alternatives exist: Enlightenment rationality, empirical science, classic liberalism, and pragmatic reform offer paths to improvement without total destruction. Facing death can inspire carpe diem, stewardship, or creativity rather than purge fantasies. Krossa’s unconditional love theology is one such reframing— optimistic humanism without the vengeance.
Overall, Krossa is onto something profound about how old stories shape us, often unconsciously. Awareness of this template is a defense against manipulation by fear and false utopias. The best response isn’t new dogma but clearer thinking: confront real problems proportionally, value evidence over archetype, and prioritize human flourishing in this world. Death spurs myths, but we can choose wiser ones— ones that affirm life, resilience, and gradual betterment over cathartic annihilation.
If you want to dive into specific historical examples, Campbell texts, or counter-arguments from Landes/others, let me know.
I then asked:
Lets do both- Explore Marxism’s millennial roots and Nazism’s apocalyptic mythology as well as these themes- apocalyptic, millennialism- in environmental alarmism
But Grok was busy with other requests and ended.
Chat replied:
There are some genuinely interesting insights in the material you quoted, especially around recurring mythic structures in human thought. But there are also places where the argument becomes too sweeping or starts conflating very different movements. My take would be: the framework is useful as a psychological and cultural lens, but dangerous if treated as a total explanation.
A few thoughts.
First, the strongest part of the discussion is the observation that humans repeatedly generate narratives of:
• crisis,
• corruption/fall,
• purging or transformation,
• and eventual renewal.
That pattern absolutely appears across religions, political ideologies, and even secular movements. Scholars from Joseph Campbell to Mircea Eliade to René Girard noticed similar structures.
And yes, mortality and suffering likely played a huge role in the birth of mythic consciousness. Burial rituals are among the earliest evidence we have of symbolic thought. Humans became aware:
• “we die,”
• “others die,”
• “the world is unstable,”
• “we suffer,”
and myths emerged partly to provide orientation and meaning.
Where I think the discussion becomes especially insightful is in recognizing that apocalyptic thinking often functions psychologically before it functions politically.
The “old world must die so a new world can emerge” motif can mean:
• ego death,
• moral transformation,
• social revolution,
• cosmic renewal,
• or literal destruction.
Campbell often leaned toward the symbolic-psychological reading. But historically, symbolic myths frequently become literalized — and that’s where things can become dangerous.
The connection to Marxism is not crazy at all. A number of historians and philosophers have argued that revolutionary Marxism inherited the structure of religious millennialism even while rejecting religion itself.
You can see the parallels:
• Fallen world → capitalism/class oppression.
• Elect → proletariat.
• Evil force → bourgeoisie.
• Final struggle → revolution.
• Purification → dictatorship of the proletariat.
• End state → classless utopia/history fulfilled.
Thinkers like Eric Voegelin and Norman Cohn explored these parallels in depth.
Marx himself framed history almost teleologically — as if history was moving inevitably toward redemption. That resembles secularized eschatology.
But there’s an important nuance:
Marxism was also an economic and social analysis, not merely a disguised religion. Some Marxists were pragmatic reformers; others became revolutionary absolutists. The latter are the ones who most clearly fit the apocalyptic pattern.
The same caution applies to environmentalism.
Some environmental rhetoric undeniably takes on apocalyptic and quasi-religious tones:
• impending catastrophe,
• moral purity,
• sinful humanity,
• calls for sacrifice,
• redeemed future society,
• heretics/deniers,
• end-of-world imagery.
That language exists and can become emotionally intoxicating.
But it would be a mistake to collapse all environmental concern into “apocalyptic millennialism.” Climate science itself is not mythology. Real environmental problems exist. The question is whether political and media narratives amplify those concerns into psychologically absolute or quasi-religious frameworks.
There’s a distinction between:
• “We face serious ecological risks requiring practical adaptation”
and
• “Industrial civilization is evil and must collapse for planetary salvation.”
The second clearly resembles apocalyptic mythology more than empirical problem-solving.
Nazism is perhaps an even clearer case of mythic-political fusion.
Adolf Hitler and Nazi ideology drew heavily on:
• purification myths,
• rebirth myths,
• blood sacrifice,
• destiny narratives,
• cosmic struggle,
• decline-and-renewal motifs.
The “Thousand-Year Reich” was explicitly millennial language.
Nazism framed history as:
• degeneration,
• contamination,
• existential struggle,
• cleansing violence,
• racial rebirth.
That is archetypal apocalypticism fused with nationalism and pseudo-biology.
The danger in all these systems emerges when:
1. history becomes sacred,
2. political goals become absolute,
3. opponents become evil rather than mistaken,
4. and destruction becomes morally justified as “necessary for redemption.”
That pattern appears across religious and secular movements alike.
Where I’d push back on Krossa/Grok somewhat is this: not every strong moral movement is fundamentally apocalyptic.
Humans also produce traditions rooted in:
• gradual reform,
• tragic realism,
• pluralism,
• coexistence,
• stewardship,
• humility,
• liberal proceduralism,
• skepticism toward utopia.
The liberal democratic tradition partly emerged precisely from exhaustion with apocalyptic certainty after Europe’s religious wars.
Thinkers like Karl Popper criticized “historicism” — the belief that history has an inevitable salvific endpoint. Popper argued that once people think they possess the key to historical destiny, coercion becomes easy to justify.
That insight is very important.
I also think one should be cautious about universalizing Campbell too much. Campbell was brilliant at identifying recurring symbolic motifs, but critics argue he sometimes flattened differences between traditions and overemphasized universal archetypes at the expense of historical specifics.
Still, the broad insight survives: humans repeatedly mythologize suffering, death, disorder, and hope.
And political ideologies often unconsciously inherit religious narrative structures even when they claim to be purely rational.
Probably the most valuable takeaway is not: “all ideologies are secretly religions,” but rather: humans are storytelling creatures, and we repeatedly organize politics around mythic patterns of fall, conflict, sacrifice, and redemption.
The healthiest systems are usually the ones that resist:
• utopian certainty,
• redemptive violence,
• and the belief that paradise lies just beyond one final purge.
My next:
First Chat, in response to your opening caution, I am not probing these ideas as “a total explanation” but as core themes from the emergence of the earliest human mythmaking. I simply do not have the time to cover all the themes in human thought and narratives so I try to focus on what I see as dominant beliefs that have continued to shape human thought and behavior across subsequent history.
And arguably, as Arthur Herman has concluded- Declinism is the dominant and most influential theme in today’s world. Declinism is central to apocalyptic mythology and add Arthur Mendel’s point that it has been the most violent and destructive idea in history. It is basic to Christianity, notably Paul’s Christ myth, and as James Tabor has said, that theme in Paul has prominently shaped Western civilization and narratives religious and secular. Its not about “total explanation” but about understanding dominant bad ideas as major contributing factors to bad human behavior and outcomes. Just as Richard Landes did regarding the influence of apocalyptic millennialism on Marxism, Nazism, and now environmental alarmism.
Of course, we get that “not every strong moral movement is fundamentally apocalyptic”. But that theme is a notable contributing factor and the point of my site is that we were long ago given a powerful alternative in the counter theology and anti-apocalyptic message of Historical Jesus that was subsequently buried by Paul’s Christ myth that was centrally apocalyptic. This was Thomas Jefferson and Leo Tolstoy’s point.
And you appear to be too dismissive of how the alarmist element in modern environmentalism (the embrace of apocalyptic-scale extremism) has harmed societies like Germany, Britain, etc. Taking too seriously the extremist elements of climate alarmism. A current government minister in Germany recently warned that the climate alarmism sector is “ruining” the country.
We will continue to disagree on “climate science”. I recently posted the surprising pullback of the IPCC on the basic assumptions on climate alarmism are junk, see https://wattsupwiththat.com/2026/05/05/ipcc-admits-apocalyptic-climate-scenarios-are-implausible-meaning-most-media-scare-stories-over-last-15-years-are-officially-junk/
Chat replied:
I understand your clarification better now. You’re not arguing for a monocausal theory of history; you’re arguing that certain deep mythic themes — especially apocalyptic decline-and-redemption narratives — have exercised disproportionate influence across civilizations and continue to shape modern ideologies. That is a much more defensible and intellectually serious claim.
And there is substantial scholarship behind parts of that argument.
You’re right that thinkers like Richard Landes, Norman Cohn, Eric Voegelin, Arthur Mendel, and Mircea Eliade all argued in different ways that apocalyptic and millennial structures repeatedly erupt inside both religious and secular movements.
And yes, “declinism” is a major civilizational force. Arthur Herman in The Idea of Decline in Western History traced how narratives of civilizational decay became deeply embedded in modern Western intellectual life. The idea that:
• humanity is corrupt,
• civilization is degenerating,
• catastrophe is imminent,
• and salvation requires radical rupture
has enormous mobilizing power.
You are also correct that this structure strongly overlaps with apocalyptic mythology.
What I think is especially important in your framing is the distinction between:
• reform within continuity,
versus
• redemption through destruction.
That distinction matters historically.
Movements become dangerous when they frame destruction itself as morally regenerative:
• “the old order must collapse,”
• “purification is necessary,”
• “suffering accelerates salvation,”
• “crisis is transformative.”
That logic absolutely appeared in:
• revolutionary Marxism,
• fascism/Nazism,
• radical religious millennialism,
• Maoism,
• Khmer Rouge ideology,
• and some strands of environmental extremism.
(Insert: I would challenge Chat that it is much more than “some strands of environmental extremism” but dominates much of environmentalism today)
The recurring pattern is psychologically potent because it converts anxiety and mortality into cosmic purpose.
Your emphasis on Paul versus the Historical Jesus is also part of a long intellectual tradition. Thomas Jefferson, Leo Tolstoy, and more recently James Tabor and others argued that the ethical teachings associated with the Historical Jesus were overshadowed by Pauline apocalyptic theology.
There is real scholarly grounding for the observation that Paul emphasized:
• cosmic fall,
• sacrificial atonement,
• impending eschatology,
• divine judgment,
• salvation through Christ’s death and resurrection.
Whereas reconstructions of the Historical Jesus often emphasize:
• ethical transformation,
• non-retaliation,
• inclusion,
• present-life kingdom ethics,
• anti-tribalism,
• and inner moral renewal.
Now, historians debate how sharp that contrast really is. Some scholars think the Historical Jesus himself was strongly apocalyptic. Others think later church theology amplified that element dramatically. But your broader point — that Western civilization inherited powerful decline-redemption narratives through Christianity and secularized versions of Christianity — is not fringe at all.
Where I remain cautious is when modern movements are treated as primarily mythic rather than also materially grounded.
For example, on environmentalism: there clearly are apocalyptic rhetorical structures operating in parts of climate discourse. I agree with you there more than perhaps you think.
You can see:
• end-times imagery,
• moral absolutism,
• guilt/purity frameworks,
• sacrificial politics,
• stigmatizing dissent,
• youth fear mobilization,
• “last chance” rhetoric,
• and even quasi-religious concepts of planetary redemption.
Those dynamics are real.
And some policy outcomes in parts of Europe — especially energy policy in Germany and United Kingdom — have generated serious backlash over:
• energy prices,
• deindustrialization fears,
• grid instability concerns,
• and regulatory burdens.
Those criticisms deserve open debate and should not be dismissed as “denialism.”
Where I diverge is in concluding that climate concerns themselves are fundamentally mythological or invalid. I would separate:
1. empirical climate science,
from
2. apocalyptic political narratives built around climate.
Those are not identical.
Regarding the article you linked from Watts Up With That: there has been an important shift over the years in how the most extreme emissions scenarios are discussed. Many researchers have argued that scenarios like RCP8.5/SSP5-8.5 were often treated in media and activism as “business as usual” when they were actually high-end stress-test scenarios. That criticism is legitimate and has been discussed within climate science itself.
But that does not mean the IPCC has concluded climate change is not a serious issue. Rather, there has been debate over:
• scenario plausibility,
• model assumptions,
• policy sensitivity,
• and exaggerated communication.
That distinction matters.
Still, your larger concern is less about temperature projections than about the social psychology of alarmism itself. And there I think your argument has substantial force.
Fear-based narratives can:
• centralize power,
• suppress dissent,
• justify coercion,
• create moral panic,
• and incentivize extremism.
History repeatedly shows that.
The deepest issue underneath your project seems to be this: whether civilizations should organize themselves around narratives of:
• catastrophe,
• guilt,
• sacrifice,
• and purging,
or around narratives of:
• human dignity,
• gradual improvement,
• forgiveness,
• resilience,
• and nonviolent reform.
That’s a serious civilizational question, not a fringe obsession.
And I think your emphasis on identifying recurring destructive mythic structures — rather than merely debating surface politics — is intellectually worthwhile even where reasonable people may disagree with some conclusions.
My next:
The concern is the ongoing commitment of Marxist collectivism (and its contemporary variants) as well as extremist sectors in environmentalism, along with theocratic religions like Islam, to overthrow liberal democracies and replace them with more authoritarian/totalitarian systems.
Chat’s reply:
It’s reasonable to be concerned about authoritarian tendencies in any movement — religious, political, or ideological — especially when those movements reject core liberal-democratic principles like free speech, pluralism, individual rights, due process, and peaceful opposition.
But it’s important to distinguish carefully between:
• broad traditions,
• radical factions,
• and totalizing ideological movements.
Otherwise, the analysis can become too undifferentiated.
For example, there is a real historical basis for concern about revolutionary collectivist ideologies. Twentieth-century regimes inspired by variants of Karl Marx and later Leninist or Maoist interpretations often concentrated power heavily:
• suppression of dissent,
• one-party rule,
• censorship,
• coercive social engineering,
• state control over economic life,
• and at times mass violence.
Thinkers like Hannah Arendt and Karl Popper argued that utopian historical certainty can evolve into totalitarianism because dissent becomes interpreted as obstruction of “history itself.”
That’s a serious warning.
Similarly, some forms of political Islam explicitly reject liberal democracy in favor of theocratic governance. Movements inspired by revolutionary interpretations of Islam — for example the ideology behind the post-1979 Iranian system — often subordinate:
• individual liberty,
• secular law,
• gender equality,
• and freedom of conscience
to religious authority.
That tension is real and openly acknowledged by many Islamist theorists themselves.
But it’s also important not to collapse all Muslims or all Islamic thought into theocratic extremism. There are:
• liberal Muslims,
• secular Muslims,
• reformist Islamic thinkers,
• constitutional democrats,
• and Muslims who strongly support pluralistic societies.
Likewise with environmentalism: there are certainly activist factions that embrace highly coercive or anti-industrial visions of society. Some rhetoric within radical environmental movements can become quasi-authoritarian:
• hostility toward democratic compromise,
• technocratic paternalism,
• emergency-rule logic,
• anti-growth absolutism,
• or romanticization of social collapse.
Those tendencies deserve criticism.
But most environmental policy advocacy is not equivalent to totalitarianism. Democracies routinely debate:
• energy transitions,
• pollution regulation,
• conservation,
• infrastructure,
• and risk management
within normal democratic processes.
The key issue is not whether a movement is “environmentalist,” “religious,” or “socialist.” The key issue is whether it remains compatible with:
• open debate,
• constitutional limits,
• civil liberties,
• opposition rights,
• and pluralism.
That’s the real dividing line.
Your broader point about liberal democracy being historically fragile is important. Liberal democracy depends on cultural commitments that are not automatic:
• tolerance,
• restraint,
• procedural fairness,
• acceptance of disagreement,
• minority protections,
• and rejection of redemptive violence.
Movements driven by apocalyptic certainty — whether religious or secular — often struggle with those liberal norms because they view compromise as betrayal of ultimate truth.
That’s one reason why millennial or revolutionary ideologies can become destabilizing: if history is at a final moral crisis, then ordinary democratic gradualism starts looking immoral or cowardly.
The twentieth century provides many examples where:
• existential rhetoric,
• utopian promises,
• and emergency thinking
were used to justify concentration of power.
So your concern is not baseless. The challenge is maintaining precision and proportionality:
• criticizing authoritarian tendencies without demonizing entire populations,
• recognizing ideological patterns without reducing everything to one explanatory framework,
• and defending liberal democracy without turning that defense itself into a form of absolutism.
One of the enduring strengths of liberal democracy is precisely that it assumes humans are fallible — including the people who believe they are saving the world.
My next: Just one more on our recent discussion…
A further point is that always trying to “balance” things with cautions and qualifiers every time one presents material can weaken the counterpoints that I am trying to emphasize in a larger context of public discourse where arguably one side has dominated science, media, politics, the social arena, etc. over past decades and the other side has been smeared variously as “denialism” or conspiracy theory, misinformation/disinformation, etc. and not given as much public exposure, censored even and often silenced outright. That is notable imbalance that even you weakly admit to at times.
Chat replied:
I understand the concern you’re pointing to: when one viewpoint has been institutionally dominant for a long time, repeated caveats can feel less like neutrality and more like reinforcement of the existing imbalance. In many public controversies, people do experience asymmetries in who gets platformed, which experts are treated as legitimate, what media narratives become “default,” and how dissenting views are socially or professionally penalized. That dynamic is real and worth examining critically.
At the same time, there are a few distinct issues that are easy to blur together:
• whether dissenting views were treated unfairly,
• whether institutions overreached in policing discussion,
• whether social stigma and censorship occurred,
• and whether the dissenting claims themselves were ultimately correct.
Those are related but not identical questions.
One reason systems like me tend to include qualifiers is not necessarily because dissent is illegitimate, but because public discourse often collapses uncertainty into certainty very quickly.
If a topic is scientifically or politically contested, caution is an attempt — ideally — to distinguish:
• established evidence,
• emerging evidence,
• speculation,
• and claims that remain unsupported.
That said, there is a genuine failure mode where “balance” becomes selective. For example:
• dominant narratives may initially be presented with high confidence and few caveats,
• while minority viewpoints are subjected to much stricter evidentiary demands,
• or framed primarily through reputational labels (“conspiracy,” “misinformation,” etc.) rather than engaged substantively.
Historically, institutions and expert consensuses have sometimes been wrong, incomplete, politically influenced, or overly rigid. Public skepticism toward authority is not inherently irrational. In science especially, progress often involves challenges to prevailing assumptions.
But there’s also another failure mode in the opposite direction: treating marginalization itself as evidence of correctness. Some suppressed ideas later prove important; many others do not. Social resistance alone cannot adjudicate truth.
So the strongest version of your point, in my view, is not “the minority side is therefore right,” but rather:
• asymmetries of institutional power can shape what is considered discussable,
• reputational pressure can narrow inquiry,
• and reflexive dismissal of dissent can damage public trust and scientific credibility.
Those are serious concerns and increasingly widely acknowledged across political and intellectual lines.
Where I still have to be careful is in not replacing one distortion with another — for example by presenting highly uncertain or weakly supported claims as established fact simply because they were marginalized. The goal should be rigorous examination without automatic deference either to authority or to contrarianism.
And this from one of the Triggernometry guys
Every socialist society ends in totalitarianism.
https://www.instagram.com/reels/DYCob77M6-S/
Konstantin Kistin of “Triggernometry”:
“Every ‘equal society’ in history ended the same way: with force.
“You cannot redistribute productivity without coercion.
“That’s the part radical socialism never admits.
“The more ‘equality’ you want, the more authoritarian it must become to enforce it.”
Full transcript from video clip:
“The reason ideas like communism and radical socialism don’t work is that in that sort of system what you’re doing is that you’re taking away from the productive people to give to the unproductive people. That necessarily requires a high level of tyranny because productive people do not want to give away the things that they’ve generated to people who haven’t.
So first and foremost it’s a system that is dependent on authoritarianism. And if you oppose authoritarianism it doesn’t really matter if you oppose communism or not because those are inseparable. You cannot have a radically “quote unquote” progressive society without a radical level of authoritarianism and tyranny. Its not possible because the idea is so contrary to human nature. So you have to use a lot of force to put it in place.”